

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Philosophers in blue shirts: Tovar's *Vida de Sócrates*

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ABSTRACT

This article focuses on the book Vida de Socrates (Life of Socrates; 1947) by Antonio Tovar Llorente (1911–1985), a Naziphile during World War II, loyal to the ideals of the Falange (a Spanish fascist organization) for many years until he publicly shifted to more liberal positions during the 1960s. The essay examines why Socrates was chosen as the book's subject, how he is linked to the author's political ideology in the 1940s, and the author's relationship to his book when it was reprinted in 1966 and 1984. The article explores the difference between scholars' intellectual ideas, scientific output, and political positions, as well as the social, cultural, political, and biographical determinations and contradictions that inform the ideological and imaginary texture of a book.

KEYWORDS

Socrates; Tovar; fascism; Spanish philosophy; sociology of intellectuals

1. Introduction

After the Spanish Civil War (1936–1939), the Francoist regime continued the repression that the Nationalists initiated during the war. This meant, ultimately, the physical elimination (execution, prison, exile) of anyone or anything associated with the Second Republic. The field of cultural production was entirely destroyed and it had to be rebuilt almost from scratch. The University was also cleansed.

This article analyses *Vida de Sócrates* (*Life of Socrates*), a relatively important book published in 1947, written by Antonio Tovar (1911–1985), a Greek Scholar, Professor of Latin in Salamanca from 1942, and a cultural icon of the Spanish Transition to democracy since the 1960s. This man, very well educated (he studied history and classics in Madrid, Paris and Berlin) and connected with the network of the internationally renowned philosopher José Ortega y Gasset, became a member of the fascist organization *Falange* (more about it below) from 1936 until the late 50s. For a few years, until 1941, he was a high propaganda officer of the Nationalist side. During this decade, with his friend the poet, editor and well-connected Dionisio Ridruejo (1912–1975) Tovar participated in the salvage and re-integration into Spanish culture of a few cultural elements of the Republic. Dissatisfied with Franco, Tovar became part of the internal opposition to the regime and went into voluntary exile.

Vida de Sócrates is a biography of the Greek philosopher. It is a good work, interesting not only as a remarkably sophisticated piece of philosophical and classical scholarship, but also because the underlying ideology links Spanish ultraconservative thinking with the authoritarian, nationalist, irrationalist philosophies of Europe. It is also noteworthy that it was re-edited a few times, without any corrections, even in 1984. This article, to conclude, reads the ideological layers of the book considering the relative autonomy of the philosophical and academic fields, undertaking 'a simultaneously political and philosophical dual reading of writings which are

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defined by their fundamental ambiguity, that is, by their reference to two social spaces, which correspond to two mental spaces'.[1]

1.1. The book and its auhor

Vida de Sócrates (Life of Socrates) first appeared in 1947, had a second edition in 1953, and was also reedited in 1966 and 1984 (and a few times thereafter, the latest being 2007).[2] On the back cover of the 1984 edition, it is described as a 'bold attempt at a general interpretation' of the life and personality of Socrates and presented as written in a style in between a philological treatise and a philosophical essay.[3]

Having been reprinted in 1984 and after, the work could be considered part of contemporary interpretations of the Greek philosopher, but this is debatable. It contains 'outdated' elements, at least for 1984, coming from a conservative vision loaded with *falangista* language,[4] even if deployed within the context of meritorious historical and philological research (a total of 426 pages of text, with 61 pages of endnotes and references), with all the scientific legitimacy this implies.

Its author, Antonio Tovar Llorente (1911–1985), was not a philosopher, but a classical scholar and linguist. He was a vastly cultured man of enormous wisdom in such areas as Latin, Ancient Greek, Indo-European linguistics, Euskara, Ancient Iberian studies, and South American pre-Columbian languages. A 1990 list of his publications contains 117 pages of titles.[5] He was part of the construction of classical studies in Spain,[6] and his disciples included Francisco Rodríguez Adrados, author of the classic *Ilustración y política en la Grecia clásica* (1966), later published (with some modifications) as *La democracia ateniense* (1975).[7] Additionally, and probably as importantly, Tovar can be considered as undoubtedly a key actor in the rebuilding of an (altered) cultural field in post-war Spain from the human and material devastation of the Spanish Civil War (1936–1939). As a young man, as well as a committed falangista, he was a believing Naziphile.[8] His bellicose 75-page pamphlet *El Imperio de España*[9] won him entry to the intellectual elite of the *Falange*, a noteworthy achievement for a 25-year-old new militant. He wanted Spain to join the New Order announced in Germany and Italy as well as a new *Imperio* for Spain, at least a spiritual one if not real.

This intelligent man would evolve, at a mature age, more democratic positions, achieving inclusion in the list of alleged *falangistas liberales*.[10]

2. The myth of Socrates as a point of departure

Why Socrates? The choice of subject must not be underestimated. Socrates' trial and death has always been seen a foundational myth in Western philosophy: loyalty to truth and freedom of expression as a way of life, up to the point of self-sacrifice. Christianity saw his execution also as

[1]P. Bourdieu, *The Political Ontology of Martin Heidegger* (Standford University Press, 1991), 3.

[2]This article is based on a much shorter (unpublished) paper delivered at the 3rd Czech–Spanish Philosophical Conference 'Topics in Spanish Philosophy', Department of Philosophy, University of Pardubice (Czech Republic), 30–31 May 2016.

[3]There are no English translations of *Vida de Sócrates*. All necessary translations were supplied by the author of this article based on the 1984 reprint (Madrid: Alianza Editorial). Words and expressions in Spanish are left in italics and/or within parentheses, with those similar enough to English to not require translation left in Spanish.

[4]'Falangista' indicates a member or sympathizer of the fascist party *Falange Española de las JONS* ('Spanish Phalanx of the Committees for the National-Syndicalist Offensive'), known simply as the *Falange*. It was a 1934 merger of two fascist organizations, the core being *Falange Española*, which had been founded by José Antonio Primo de Rivera in 1933. See the classic S.G. Payne, *Falange: A History of Spanish Fascism* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1961).

[5]*Biblioteca Virtual Miguel de Cervantes*, http://www.cervantesvirtual.com/portales/tovar/.

[6]F. García Jurado, 'El nacimiento de la filología clásica en España. La facultad de filosofía y letras de Madrid (1932–1936)', *Estudios Clásicos* 134 (2008): 77–104.

[7]Cited in J. Ober, 'What the Ancient Greeks Can Tell Us about Democracy', *Annual Reviews in Political Science* 11 (2008): 67–91.

[8]See Payne, *Falange*; and W.H. Bowen, *Spaniards and Nazi Germany: Collaboration in the New Order* (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 2000).

[9]Published anonymously in 1936, republished under his name in 1938, and expanded in 1941 with 100 additional pages.

[10]See S. Juliá, '¿Falange liberal o intelectuales fascistas?' *Claves de Razón Práctica* 121 (2002): 4–13.

martyrdom allegorically replicating Christ's supreme ordeal. Any student of the humanities has and will again come across this eccentric character, considered by many the founding father of philosophy, the proto-intellectual. Whatever its interpretation – some permutations will be described herein – the myth of Socrates is a hypertext, both static and dynamic; it is part of a canon of philosophical *personae* surrounding the centre of that philosophical canon: Plato.

Socrates' condemnation to death and execution has been represented, 'idealized,' so to speak, as the serene passing away of a lover of wisdom, a philosopher's death, showing coherent obedience to the laws of the state. An end becoming a beginning, the truth is that his demise was a victory prefiguring numerous other just heroes condemned by an unjust and uncontrolled regime of visionless citizens. As noted by Jennifer T. Roberts, there was a time in the historiography of Ancient Greece and Western philosophy in which Socrates was the only hero of a quirky and unpredictable democracy: Socrates and Phocion were clear examples of the dangers lurking in mob rule or ochlocracy, not *demokratia*, 'power of the people'.[11] For individuals with political stances as radical as the one taken by the young Tovar, Spartans and Romans made better heroes, an opinion paradoxically coinciding *malgré eux* with French revolutionaries. Nevertheless, whether due to intelligence or rather the effect of a mental habit prone to investigation and resultant skepticism and doubt, Tovar's narrative about Socrates contains many surprising shades and nuances, as we will see.

Be that as it may, the myth of Socrates as a martyr has continued through the present, with a tenacious persistence in popular culture and philosophy. It is possible that the expression 'myth' (of Socrates) may require a brief explanation. It obviously brings to mind the thorny question of why Socrates was tried, sentenced, and executed and why he accepted his fate. This is an unsolved enigma, but the evidence points to a political motivation in a tense post-war atmosphere, aggravated by his behaviour during the trial and a situational factor: the effect of that behaviour on the judges.[12]

3. A promising career

In January 1944 in Vienna, Antonio Tovar improvised a lecture on Socrates, having lost both his draft and notes in a bombardment during a previous stay in Berlin.[13] *Vida de Sócrates* was written around 1945–1946, collating research and student notes, by a young man who, between 1936 and 1941, had been a falangista militant intensely involved in institutionally important activities; by a young man launching a promising career before he was cut off from active politics.

In 1941, he left politics and took up a professorship in Latin at the University of Salamanca (1942), where he would become rector (1951–1956); at the same time, he was appointed by decree of the chief of State 'Procurador en Cortes por Consejero Nacional' (Deputy of Parliament – National Delegate) of the Falange between 1943 and 1946. Between 1948 and 1949, he spent a year at the University of Buenos Aires studying indigenous languages. Problems with institutions at the University of Salamanca drove him into exile in Argentina from 1958 until 1959 at the National University of Tucumán, where he would carry on his study of indigenous languages: 'That was the date of my definitive rupture with the Falange,' he declared in 1973.[14] He would still return to Spain for a short period (after obtaining the Latin professorship in Madrid), and then once more leave after a while for an academic post at the University of Illinois. This time, his resignation was voluntary, triggered by the scandalous expulsion from the university in 1965 of professors Enrique Tierno Galván, José Luis López-Aranguren, Agustín García Calvo, and Santiago Montero Díaz. This short comeback

[11] J.T. Roberts, *Athens on Trial* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), 304.
[12] See the section *The Death of Socrates* below.
[13] Based on a document from the Ministerio de Educación Nacional, located in the *Archivo General de la Administración* (AGA; Alcalá de Henares; Box 55/01972 – Personal Record – Antonio Tovar).
[14] Interview conducted by Juan Luis Cebrián, published in *Gentleman* 1 (1973): 35–40. Available online: 'Confesiones de Antonio Tovar', *Biblioteca Virtual Miguel de Cervantes* (2011), http://www.cervantesvirtual.com/obra/confesiones-de-antonio-tovar/. J.L. Cebrián, son of Vicente Cebrián – a high ranking Francoist propaganda officer until 1970 and director of *Arriba* during 1957–1960 – founded *El País* in 1976 and remained its editor-in-chief until 1988.

to Madrid and return to Illinois was followed by an offer of a full Professorship of Comparative Linguistics at the University of Tübingen, where he remained until retirement in 1978; he was also appointed 'Académico de la Real Academia Española' for 1968–1985.

Tovar was a close friend of the poet Dionisio Ridruejo (1912–1975), also a former student at the Colegio María Cristina de los Agustinos, El Escorial, and his friends included such intellectuals and writers as Pedro Laín Entralgo, Luis Felipe Vivanco, Luis Rosales, Rodrigo Uría, and Gonzalo Torrente Ballester, all members or sympathizers of the Falange and part of the 'Grupo de Burgos,' and many of them ending up in the rebellion against Franco. In order to understand *Vida de Sócrates*, we have to return to 1933.

3.1. Classics and politics: a grant in Berlin

Like many young falangistas, Tovar came from a middle-class social background. He studied Law and the Humanities ('Filosofía y Letras') in Valladolid, and Classics in Madrid. He held a scholarship at the Sección de Estudios Clásicos, where he may have met Américo Castro. As part of the Centro de Estudios Históricos, he probably met Ramón Menéndez Pidal and was a student of the philosopher Xavier Zubiri.[15] He took part in two study trips, 'student cruises through the Mediterranean,' in 1933 and 1934, organized by the *Institución Libre de Enseñanza*. In Valladolid, Tovar was president of a republican organization, the *Federación Universitaria Escolar*. However, he got closer to the Falange probably under the influence of – or in harmony with – his intimate friend D. Ridruejo, a member of the *Falange Española* since its beginnings in 1933 and therefore an 'old shirt' ('camisa vieja').[16]

The *Junta de Ampliación de Estudios* (Board for Advanced Studies and Scientific Research) granted Tovar a scholarship to study in Paris and Berlin during the academic year of 1935–1936, so as to sophisticate his formation.[17] He would have attended lectures by Benveniste, Jaeger, Bloch and others.[18] It was also in Berlin, probably, where he would be drawn towards National Socialism; the propaganda there presented Hitler as a new Pericles.[19] It is true, however, that in an interview in 1973 (two years before Franco's death) he stated that Nazism never 'attracted' him and that 'Rosenberg's book on the racist myth was garbage nonsense' [lit. *paparrucha*], explaining that he preferred Italian fascism even to the Falange ('a very narrow theoretical framework that could be used as an urgent solution to the special moment then in Spain'), but when civil war broke out 'we had to choose … I chose the side of the *Nacionales*.'

The outbreak of the Spanish Civil War (17–18 July 1936) caught Tovar at the end of his second semester in Berlin, visiting a *Hitlerjugend* summer camp.[20] Together with a group of other students grouped around the *ABC* journalist Eugenio Montes, he left Berlin for Spain, where he came already as a 'blue shirt.' But the forking paths of history took an unexpected turn.

3.2. From falangista to professor

There are two crucial moments in Tovar's career in which politics and the university get involved: the second one, in 1965, when he was in his fifties, was the direct confrontation with authorities that led

[15] A. Tovar's pre-war curriculum is not at all clear, and it is therefore not easy to draw conclusions. A full and objective biography has yet to be written, with so many private and public archives still closed or undiscovered.

[16] The attire of falangistas was a blue shirt.

[17] 'Classics' was a degree in the process of creation; there was no tradition and therefore bright students would receive scholarships to travel abroad; see F. García Jurado, 'El nacimiento de la filología clásica en España'.

[18] Regarding the Jaeger, Benveniste, and Bloch lectures, there is only a description in a handwritten note in one of Tovar's academic records, available at the *AGA* (Box 55/01972).

[19] V. Azoulay, 'Pericles, a Mirror-Image of Hitler: The Builder-Leader', in *Pericles of Athens*, ed. Azoulay (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014), 217 ff.; also Roberts, *Athens on Trial*, 12, 294. And yet the Nazis, at the same time, saw themselves in Sparta and the myth of Leonidas was part of their militaristic propaganda.

[20] As stated by Tovar himself in 'El comienzo de la guerra: de Berlín a Valladolid', *El País*, (1985), a draft of an article commissioned by the periodical and published two days after his death (as well as on 18 July 1986, commemorating the 50th anniversary).

to his resignation and self-exile. The first key moment in Tovar's career, crucial because it took place early in his life, can be found in 1941. Tovar had been recruited to the propaganda team led by Ramón Serrano Suñer (1901–2003), forming a kind of duumvirate with Ridruejo, then nicknamed the 'Spanish Goebbels.' Both would be part of the reorganization of cultural life of the first Francoism after the victory. There was enthusiasm: they thought they were changing Spain with their writings, seeing themselves as part of a messianic elite, living imperial dreams of the New Order they saw embodied in the Axis.[21] They believed in the '*Falange auténtica*' as the vanguard of a fascist revolution without the racist obsession of German anti-Semitism, the murderous *Judenhass* (Jew-hatred). Still, this was mildly manifested in a few crude and violent sentences against Jews in *El Imperio de España*. In this book, Tovar would call for 'clarity and violence' against the enemies of Spain, asserting, 'History must not be steered using your head. History is blood. These pages have been written following the dictates of the heartbeats of Castile.'[22] During these years, there were different trips to Germany, to Himmler, Hitler, and Ribbentrop, and discussions of possible Spanish entry into the war (including the famous Hendaya interview between Franco and Hitler).[23]

The grandiose dreams of *falangismo auténtico* ended in expulsion. Franco slowly but thoroughy got rid of Naziphiles and extremists and in the process Serrano Suñer, nicknamed 'el Cuñadísimo' (he was Franco's wife Carmen Polo's brother-in-law or *cuñado*), and his entourage, among them Ridruejo and Tovar, fell. For Tovar, an act of rebellion in 1941 against this process would mean his expulsion from high politics.

The history of the fall of the fascist revolutionary wing of the Falange is well known. Its demise was part of struggles among elites in the *bando nacional* for power – mainly control of key state ministries – and cultural monopoly. In the end, National Syndicalism disintegrated and technocrats from the *Opus Dei* were empowered to reach the top decision-making places in the state apparatuses. A new official ideology was created: Nacional-Catolicismo, a synthesis of extreme nationalism and an ultra-Catholic faith. Obviously, the Falange was involved in the creation because the process meant a power transaction between the cultural and the political.[24] At the end of the civil war, the architecture of the new regime was being designed and Franco's efforts focused on keeping content – and steady – the three pillars of his power: the army, the church, and the Falange. Gradually, the more extreme falangistas, those pushing for National Syndicalism and entry into the war, were removed from power: many of them went to fight with the Wehrmacht on the Eastern Front during 1941–1943.[25] In the Europe of 1939–1945, Franco juggled politically to combine, manipulate, and resolve the sectarian and personal envies and revulsion of those involved in the power game of the political field including: the military, *Opus Dei*, Falange, Monarchists, Conservatives, *Carlistas*, and banks.[26]

3.3. The Galarza affair

The so-far suppressed falangista unrest blew up in May 1941, the crisis precipitating on 5 May, when Serrano Suñer – then minister of 'Gobernación' (the Ministry of the Interior) – was replaced by Colonel Valentín Galarza, a military man deeply hostile to the Falange. His appointment caused such turmoil among 'old shirts' that in a matter of a few days, 10 top officers of *Falange Española Tradicionalista* in the provinces resigned from their posts, including Madrid. Reaction against Galarza intensified during the days following his appointment and reached a culmination with the publication of an unsigned article in *Arriba* entitled 'The man and the apprentice.' Though

[21]In addtion to Payne and Bowen, see also S. Juliá, *Historia de las dos Españas* (Madrid: Taurus, 2004).
[22]A. Tovar, *El Imperio de España* (Madrid: Afrodisio Aguado, 1941), 77.
[23]See Bowen, *Spaniards and Nazi Germany*. Some traces of these trips can be found in various documents in the *AGA*.
[24]Obviously, it is not possible to go into detail here, so the summary is schematic. See Payne, *Falange*, ch. XV–XVII.
[25]Bowen, *Spaniards and Nazi Germany*; also C. Caballero Jurado, *Morir en Rusia: La División Azul en la Batalla de Krasny Bor* (Valladolid: Quirón Ediciones, 2004). Approximately 20,000 men (and some women, as nurses) joined as volunteers; in 1941 these were typically falangistas, but later reinforcements (1942–1943) and tours were filled, more and more, by conscripts and draftees. After the withdrawal, a few hundred remained, illegally, in special *Waffen-SS* units, along with other foreigners.
[26]The problem of Franco's support for the Axis is still under debate. See P. Preston, 'Franco's Nazi Haven', *History Today* 47 (1997).

not directly stated, the allusion could not have referred to anyone other than Galarza. The military called for retaliation, namely the head of the insult's author, attributed to Ridruejo. But Tovar, as Press and Propaganda Chief of the Falange, was so elegant as to take total responsibility. To soothe the military, Franco removed Tovar and Ridruejo from office in spite of their being Serrano's protégés. Franco's skillful maneuvering managed to console the falangistas by appointing José Luis Arrese (former provincial chief in Malaga) general secretary of the Falange.

The extent to which the removal emotionally shocked Tovar is difficult to say; 'bitterness, but not resentment,' he stated in 1973. Ridruejo went to fight Communism in Russia and Tovar committed himself more to his academic career; he was appointed Professor of Classics (Latin) in Salamanca, in March 1942, after completing the demanding competitive examinations or *oposiciones*.[27] Steadily and rapidly, the regime proceeded towards firm 'overcatholicization and infrafascistization.'[28] The situation of a 'betrayed' or 'pending' revolution was disillusioning, creating a feeling of disappointment and of having been deceived and, undoubtedly, a resentful elite. The emotional energy in the cultural field, however, remained high: from 1939, Tovar, Ridruejo, Laín, and others created and managed such journals as *Escorial* (1940) and *Garcilaso* (1943). Tovar was also involved in the creation of the Centro Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, the Francoist continuation of the Centro de Estudios Históricos. His propaganda writings – crudely ideological – were concentrated in such periodicals as *Pueblo* and *Arriba*.

4. Cultural, philosophical, academic, political – field

Different rhythms and social logics can coexist during the same historical period because ideology and the political field may not synchronize. Philosophy has its own internal history. The political affinities of fascists and National Catholics during the 1940s in Spain must not be confused with their political positioning: neither in order to group them into a 'generation' nor to rescue anybody (as in the case of the *falangistas liberales*), thus putting philosophical and political differences on the same level.[29] In the Spanish case, there was a usurpation of intellectual hegemony, accompanied by the imposition of a different philosophical norm. Orteguian networks, a model of philosophy which gave precedence to a hybridization of philosophy and social sciences, were attacked and dismantled and a new model was imposed. This was based on the model of the systematic commentary, specialized around sacred texts from the canon, in other words, a scholastic model. Nonetheless, as J. Costa explains, Ortega's philosophy, school, and working methods were still valued during the 1940s because the attack did not completely alter the philosophical norm. After the war, however, the academic – systematic – and canonic model of philosophy prevailed over the more 'mundane' Orteguian model, which was accused of being '*ontófobo*' (ontophobic), journalistic and dilettante. The expulsion of the philosophical field and the new canonical norm did not stabilize until the 1950s: in the intellectual 'wasteland' of the 1940s the garden of the 1930s still thrived.[30] *Vida de Sócrates* is partially a product of the Orteguian network. It is a special one, however, because the entire narrative is written from a José-Antonian perspective.[31]

5. Socrates, the tightrope walker

Following the narrative of *Vida de Sócrates*, 'within the two opposing currents that agitate 6th-century Hellenic religiosity, the legalist', i.e. the norm of the city, 'and the interiorist and mystic current, Socrates openly takes a position in favour of the former,' but,

[27]Records in the *AGA* (Box 55/01972).
[28]Juliá, *Historia*, 411.
[29]J. Costa, 'Comentario a *La norma de la filosofía. La configuración del patrón filosófico español tras la Guerra Civil* (José Luis Moreno Pestaña, 2013)', *Anales del Seminario de Historia de la Filosofía* 31 (2014), 545–52, 546.
[30]A. Castro, 'La zona gris. Unas notas sobre La norma de la filosofía, de J. L. Moreno Pestaña', *Daimon. Revista Internacional de Filosofía* 64 (2015), 147–53, 152.
[31]The expression is used by Juliá, *Historia*, 334, referring to how Laín, Tovar, and others read Ortega. 'José-Antonian' obviously refers to the founding father of the *Falange*, José Antonio Primo de Rivera.

> naturally, Socrates was sincerely religious and this legalism, this exteriority, covered a personal and authentic religiosity. Many people did not understand at all the difficult balance that virtually sustained Socrates, and an opposing atmosphere must have been formed of people who may have accused him of being a hypocrite. (148)[32]

A book reviewer also did not seem to understand this: 'What we almost do not like is that image of Socrates always in balance,' between the old and the new, between reason and reaction, between traditional religion and *daimon*.[33]

This 'funambulist' Socrates is the book's main problem; among the more than 400 pages of text and 90 pages of endnotes, we can find the rhetoric of the National Catholic regime alongside the best tradition of positivist historicism. The style, essay-like and literary, is interwoven with obsessive signifiers of *falangismo*: reflections on such problems as fatherland and decadence, the rooting-in (*arraigo*) the soil/land (*tierra*), fundamentalist religion, irrationalism, and so on. All of these themes are sewn onto a historical study of the figure of Socrates, rigorous and exhaustive, relying mainly on Xenophon, on the one hand, and German philology, on the other. The text could, therefore, be unfolded into different layers: a subconsciously political falangista and a cultural *habitus* of the university, this one of an Orteguian type.

5.1. Ionians, Dorians, and Salamancans. A philosopher in a blue shirt

What Tovar considers to be the book's main contribution is presented in the opening chapters and taken up again at the end in chapter XV, 'Socrates' heritage':

> The ultimate reason that draws Socrates to that dissatisfaction is his deep religious seriousness, his honesty, which freed him from the tendency to frivolity that dominated Greek culture turned irreligious. This is the key to the Socratic secret that it seems to me – and I hope I will be forgiven if it sounds vain – that nobody has dealt with, (412)

though the idea was probably inspired in Horneffer's *Der junge Platon* (1922).[34]

All the rest, 'Ionians or sophists, pre-Socratics or disciples,' did not understand Socrates and, 'absorbed by an intellectual passion' succumbed to the temptation of surrendering the 'old and fertile faith' to their 'destructive and rebellious intelligences' (412). This dressing-down *contra Gentiles* is followed by a short discussion of Nietzsche's Socrates (413–414) and a questioning of professional philosophers: 'it is an atrocious anachronism,' he exclaims, 'to believe that Socrates was a kind of a lecturer of philosophy' (414).

The Athens of Tovar, at the moment of Socrates' appearance on the historical scene, has an 'Ionian character […] manifest in old age, respect, and deep-rootedness.' The Athenian people are conservative, with 'ancient roots,' in contrast with the Dorians, more 'rational and younger' (57) and Aryans arrived from the North, 'with their heads ready for geometry and dialectics' (58). Sparta, described as more a 'boot camp' than a city (59), is paradoxically geometric and dialectic, while democracy in Athens is proof of its conservatism and traditionalism:

> It would be misleading to believe that the Athenian democracy is something progressive or revolutionary just because Sparta and the Dorian world in general (that of the most recent invasion) is inclined toward oligarchic political systems. On the contrary, Athenian democracy is dominated by people deeply rooted [*gentes arraigadas*] in the land, dependent on tradition, respectful of the civil forms inherited from their forbears. Democratic equity, *isonomía*, has been achieved through the erosion of an old society.(57)

It is not clear what is intended by this emphasis on social ultraconservatism; it is as if the social reform of Kleisthenes or the revolution of Ephialtes had not taken place. It might allude to the *patrios*

[32]Quotes from *Vida de Sócrates* are cited by page number from the 1984 edition within parentheses.
[33]E. Amaya, *Thesaurus*, IV, 3 (1948), 597–601, 599, 601.
[34]Tovar himself cites this work. In Horneffer's work, 'the religiosity of Plato and Socrates is a sincere resistance to the skeptical "Enlightenment" of the Sophistic age,' according to P. Shorey, '*Der junge Platon* by Ernst Horneffer. Part I. Sokrates und die Apologie. Giessen: Alfred Topelmann, 1922', *Classical Philology* 17 (1922), 173–5, 173.

politeia, though this is not explained. If we read it through falangista mythology as (conscious or unconscious) ideological *mythemes*, however, it makes more sense: the keywords are 'land,' 'tradition,' 'religion,' and 'irrationalism.'

For Tovar, the problem in Athens was the triumph of the Enlightenment (59). The 'plebs' were gradually separating from the city, rationalizing the venerable inherited institutions ('even the uneducated mob plays sophist, Plato will say' [81]). Socrates,

> opposing also those who wanted, in the name of the new ideas, to reform the state – and much of what was in the revolutions provoked by the Peloponnesian War from the Sicilian catastrophe – found himself alone and started becoming an individualist. (80)

The classical democratic Athens of Tovar is a city afflicted by a 'ferocious rule of envy' (71) in which the salary for participating in public political life becomes 'a way of life for the poor and idle, who thus feel themselves masters of the life and property of the rest' (71). It is an example of what historian Ellen Wood called the 'myth of the idle mob,' one with a long history present, for example, in Fustel de Coulanges and Burckhardt.[35] In *A Book about Plato* (1956), Tovar wrote,

> Plato always thought that with the entry of tanners and sausage makers into politics, something very important had definitely gone wrong, and that and only that was a sufficient explanation for the moral degeneration that disgusted him and kept him away.[36]

In *Vida de Sócrates,* he wrote,

> With a bit of humor, a late sophist [Maximus of Tyre] says that it is Athens, and not Socrates, who corrupted Critias and Alcibiades. In Socrates persisted this traditional spirit, receptive, conservative, vital, that maintains – better than men do, always more rational – that world inhabited by women and children. (81)

A spontaneous Socrates, vital, deep-rooted [*arraigado*] in the soil, even racially:

> Socrates, from a racial point of view, is an old Mediterranean man. We know that he is despised by aristocrats. His features, as can be seen in portraits, show a type not at all Nordic. Somewhere he is described as what the Germans call *ostisch* – this quite mongoloid type existing in East Germany and the Slavic countries. (61)

Sophroniscus' son, from the deme of Alopeke, has become in Salamanca an entity more imaginary and literary than real, a mixture of the Orteguian *raciovitalismo* and the obsession about rootedness in the land, a religious and patriotic man, a rebel trying to contain the decadence provoked by rationalism and modernization.[37]

How is it possible that this book was reedited in 1966 and reprinted in 1984 and later? Tovar's themes and argumentation so far described and summarized herein are interwoven in a text showing a remarkable – sometimes erudite – knowledge of sources.[38] The issue here is that Tovar mixes scientific research with academic practices of his historical moment, such as historical analogy, folding it into ideological patterns, a lexicon of National Catholic cadences.

These are the ideas of an outstanding philologist, historian, essayist philosopher writing a book about Socrates in an 'Orteguian' way with fascist edges, class racism and a few patriarchal pearls such as that about the philosopher Hipparchia:

[35]E.M. Wood, 'The Myth of the Idle Mob,' in *Peasant-Citizen and Slave. The Foundations of Athenian Democracy*, ed. E.M. Wood (London: Verso, 1988), 5–41. See also the citation in Roberts, *Athens on Trial*, 267.

[36]A. Tovar, *Un libro sobre Platón* (Madrid: Espasa Calpe, 1956), 19.

[37]Ortega coined the term 'razón vital,' a reflection and synthesis, escaping from irrationalism – the concept that life responded only to impulses – but also from excessive rationalization.

[38]The idea of a 'rooted' and religious Socrates, close to the aristocracy (Alcibiades, Critias, Carmides), has been studied by many historians, from L. Canfora, *Una profesión peligrosa. La vida cotidiana de los filósofos griegos* (Barcelona: Anagrama, 2002) to Roberts, *Athens on Trial.* 'Many scholars have concluded that, to one degree or another, Socrates must be counted among those loyal to the oligarchic faction,' T. Brickhouse and N.D. Smith, *The Trial and Execution of Socrates: Sources and Controversies* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 191, see 219, n. 13. The list includes Grote, Guthrie, Stone, Taylor, and Vlastos. See the next section and notes 42, 43.

> Later, a philosopher of the cynic school, Hipparchia, reveals to us the truth in all this process of rationalization and cold fixation: when the atheist Theodoros asked her how she could abandon the distaff and loom, she answered that the time that she would have spent with the distaff she would prefer to dedicate to education. And if a caricature of education is sought – an education transformed into an idol demanding human sacrifices – that of Hipparchia could serve as a model. This education consisted, for these degenerated descendants, in wasting their useful time, time which ancient women had devoted to the distaff, in the most useless and sterilizing of enterprises. (222)

Patriarchy, along with anti-intellectualism – a leitmotiv of the book – also appears in crude and unfortunate forms: 'Fortune judged correctly, allowing the works of Epicurus, Zeno, and Chrysippus, of all the ethical treatise writers, to be lost' (143).

5.2. The death of Socrates

Chapter XIII, a few pages longer than the others, is dedicated to the trial and death sentence of Socrates, the original sin of Athenian democracy. It is not an exaggeration to say that every intellectual or philosopher has made a pronouncement about the dilemma. The purpose of this work is not to analyze it and a relevant bibliography would be immense.[39] A final or conclusive explanation is not possible, mainly because the puzzle is incomplete, to the point that it is not surprising that Finley (1973) thought that Socrates was put on trial in 399 'by some chance.' It cannot be ascertained if it was a political or religious trial, or both, or if there was a personal quarrel (with Anytos, Meletos, or Lycon). The cause for condemnation could have been Socrates' arrogant and defiant irony (the 'wisest man' according to Apollo), used in his strength trial – or *agôn* – between him and the tribunal, ending in the final sarcasm: 'Now what is fitting for a poor man who is your benefactor, and who needs leisure to exhort you? There is nothing, men of Athens, so fitting as that such a man be given his meals in the prytaneum' (*Plat. Apol.* 36b–d).[40] Socrates 'saw the trial as a didactic,' says J. Ober.[41] For Hansen, there is no evidence to think that the jurors condemned Socrates unjustly, for they 'voted honourably, believing that they were protecting the democratic institutions of Athens.'[42] The tone the old sophist used is also memorable: a tone of arrogance, often sarcasm, or, as Xenophon wrote, *megalegoría*, 'high-flown speech style' or, literally, 'big talking.'

If we take Plato's *Apology*, 'a defense without *sophrosyne,*'[43] as an almost reliable document, and do not leave out Xenophon's testimony, in my opinion Socrates' attitude was *situationally* out of place. Not long before the trial, there had been mass killings perpetrated by the Thirty Tyrants. Undoubtedly, the citizens had in mind Critias and Alcibiades, the former being one of the bloodiest of the Thirty, the latter in part responsible for Sicily. They also remembered those men, conservative pro-Spartans, who had betrayed the Athenian fleet at Aegospotami, after which the Spartan general Lysander had ordered the killing of 3,000 prisoners.[44] Too many deaths, too much lost, and the accused, a haughty old man hostile to the *dêmos*, speaking as a teacher with a defiant attitude,

[39]The bibliography about Socrates is oceanic. On the trial, defense, and death, the academic scalpel has unveiled many myths, its most recent fruits being: Brickhouse and Smith, *The Trial and Execution*; J. Ober, 'The Trial of Socrates as Political Trial: Explaining 399 BCE', 2015, https://stanford.academia.edu/JosiahOber/Drafts, adapted from J. Ober, 'Socrates in Democratic Athens', in *Cambridge Companion to Socrates*, ed. D. Morrison (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 138–76. These studies deepen questions and suggest new approaches, but many arguments were already put forward by M.I. Finley, 'Socrates and Athens', in *Aspects of Antiquity: Discoveries and Controversies*, ed. M.I. Finley (London: Chatto &Windus, 1968), 58–72, and M.I. Finley, 'Sócrates y la Atenas postsocrática', in M.I. Finley; M.H. Hansen, *The Trial of Sokrates – from the Athenian Point of View* (Copenhagen: The Royal Danish Academy of Sciences and Letters, 1995). In Spain, see, for example, G.M. Luri, *El proceso de Sócrates: Sócrates y la transposición del socratismo* (Madrid: Editorial Trotta, 1998).

[40]Translation by Harold North Fowler (London: William Heinemann, 1966).

[41]Ober, 'The Trial of Socrates', 1.

[42]Hansen, *The Trial of Sokrates*, 31:

> We have no evidence to refute the argument that in condemning Sokrates the jurors voted honorably, believing that they were protecting the democratic institutions of Athens. Therefore, this investigation of the trial of Sokrates must end in Socratic ignorance with a query.

[43]Luri, *El proceso de Sócrates*, pp. 83–91.

[44]See charges in Roberts, *Athens on Trial*, pp. 14, 47; discussion in P. J. Rhodes, *Alcibiades: Athenian Playboy, General and Traitor* (Barnsely: Pen and Sword, 2011), and J. de Romilly, *Alcibíades o los peligros de la ambición* (Barcelona: Seix Barral, 1996).

not only refusing a proper defense but even pretending to judge his judges, accusing Athens, and – even if playacting the opposite – 'making the weaker argument the stronger' (*Plat. Apol.* 18b). That has a name: *hybris*, but whose? Athens or Socrates? It does not justify a death sentence, and, in any case, the *Apology* looks like a tragedy (another Antigone) written by a writer of tragedies turned philosopher.

How did Tovar reflect on all that? Tovar's reflection has the merit of being relatively objective: firstly, he did not accept the anachronism of Renan, 'inquisition and heresy' (353). Tovar correctly located the context along the outline and traces left by surviving sources. He justly saw an Athens severely damaged and hardened by the horrors of war and foreign occupation, by revolutions, counterrevolutions, and repressions. In short, he presented the perspective of a man who had lived through a civil war and took refuge in an air-raid shelter in Berlin in December 1943. He blamed sophist ideas and radical democracy, the imperialist 'party,' with a crude simplification: 'The new ideas had become instruments of sacking and blood, and the supremacy of the strongest had been preached' (350). This description clearly brings to mind the Spanish Republic of the 1930s: the fear of a Bolshevik republic, in opposition to the republic of Ortega y Gasset. Tovar dreamed about the Athens of Pericles, probably imagined as an ideal 'führer' or 'el Caudillo' (Franco and/or José Antonio Primo de Rivera), and the time when Socrates was young, 'when democracy had not yet degenerated and the new culture had not arrived in Athens and life was not yet modernized and complicated' (350).

The truth is that if Socrates had run away, or if it had been just a question of paying a fine, he would have been seen as another sophist. Tovar's intuition is accurate: 'But if he left Athens and took refuge anywhere, what would be the difference between him and the wandering sophists, Anaxagoras, Diagoras the Melian?' (380). Socrates conquered posterity with his death, transforming his defeat into a victory, almost as the ultimate irony of the dialogues.

5.3. The 'disease that is civilization.' The 1946 prologue as research program

In *Vida de Sócrates*, the objectivity of historical research and the *defamiliarization* that – rather paradoxically – involves its subjects fuses together into a collage or palimpsest of ultranationalist and fundamentalist catholic ideas. This is presented in the prologue to the 1947 edition, dated from November 1946 (pp. 9–23), a text somewhat nuanced – estranged – in the short but dense introductory note to the 1984 edition (pp. i–iii), a late date surely demanding an estrangement from the man of the 1940s . (This note, put together in a fragile manner, written at the beginning of 1984, seems decisive to understanding the relationship between late-period Tovar and this (his) book and its meaning in 1984.)

Initially, the 1947 prologue underlines the importance of the subject and the difficulty of the task, the enigma of Socrates. The author then links the work to an inner identity: it is a book of 'erudition' but 'lived during a few years by somebody who carries the weight of many contemporary anguishes,' somebody who had found in human nature 'common humanity, what the Greeks of the 5th century shared with us, humanity from here and now and forever, which is what makes Socrates alive and this book interesting' (10), an idea repeated at the end, to form a ring composition.

The book goes on to express closeness to sources and distance from 'modern works' (12), e.g. seeking as the ancients did the *carácter* in what the moderns read 'anecdotes.' This apparent anti-academicism is already explicit in the sardonic first note: 'It has been rightly argued that philology is for overwhelmed, tired men.' The Nietzschean undertone is interesting, for Tovar's Socrates is almost the inverse of what the German philosopher wrote about Socrates. But Tovar invokes Spengler and Unamuno as inspiration:

> What I have learned more from Spengler is that absolutely prophetic sensitivity with which he indicated the passage from a living culture into a mechanized and arteriosclerotic civilization. This truth, revealed to Unamuno and Spengler at the same time, is what allows us to situate Socrates in his proper place. (14)

This was followed in a footnote by a banal reference as a 'forerunner' to the conservative and neo-Catholic Spanish philosopher Donoso Cortés, a key ideologue of Spanish traditional conservatism.

Two keys to understanding the book are given not much later. The first is that 'the laws of attrition and sterilization cannot be established; but Socrates had the feeling that men, like plants, lose all their fecundity and all their creative capacities at the moment they are uprooted' (15). The second is another irrationalist and anti-intellectual statement:

> A dose of anti-civilization, of barbarism, of life unilluminated by the sterilizing light of reason, is what can ensure the vitality of a man and the culture to which he belongs. Socrates' genius can be measured in the constraint he tried to put on Reason, who in his time triumphantly and forever entered Athens. (15–6)

The language of the philosophical current of vitalism ('in these pages, there is something like a sigh for the lost paradise of a free, authentic, strong, instinctive, religious, and meaningful life' [18]), and the metaphorical opposition of 'deep-rootedness' (*arraigo*; Socrates/religion) to 'uprootedness' (*desarraigo*; sophists/rationalism), appears repeatedly (pp. 18–20), in crude – almost eugenic – language: rationalization, whether reactionary or revolutionary – Tovar warns – 'is lethal and, when it appears, nobody can escape from it. The virus of Reason spreads to each and every one of us' (20). This was the motivation which triggered the mission of the philosopher from the deme of Alopeke: 'During the unfortunate years that Socrates had to live, impiety grew slowly, and the critique of inherited faith opened the horizon to exterior truth. Socrates was the first Athenian who experienced adventure,' going back to inherited religion (19) and even preferring – with joy – 'the pyre to excommunication' from his homeland (21), due to the depth of his roots in the 'racial humus' (21), in contrast with, among others, the Ionian Anaxagoras:

> This is, as we will see, the profound difference existing between our old Socrates and all the philosophers and sophists who, uprooted, did not at all mind getting rid of their cities, unloaded of all piety toward their local gods, like true excommunicated people, separated from all community with their native world. (20)

Anaxagoras, 'wandering' and 'uprooted' (*desarraigado*), is an obvious reverberation of the fascist contraposition of the 'fatherland' *versus* the 'nationless wandering Jew.' The anti-Semitic tone is clear, as it was in the 1936–1941 pamphlet *El Imperio de España*, where he also attacks those 'without fatherland,' 'los sin patria,' i.e. rootless cosmopolitan individuals and intellectuals, accusing them of not having 'historical consciousness,' 'sentido de la historia': as enemies of Spain, these lacked 'claridad y violencia.' Among those 'wandering' were those exiles that had left Spain during or after the civil war.

In a world without the optimism of the ideology of progress and in full cultural decadence (21), there is a conflict between blood and reason (21) where 'blood knows this world better than intelligence, however clear that intelligence can be' (21). The fratricidal war is described – with a German expression, of course – as a necessary event for the resolution of the '*letzte Unerkennbarkeit*, desperate mystery' of Socrates:

> Western rationalism could not understand Socrates, and it has been necessary for the present-day worldwide crisis and our war in Spain to sink their claws into the author in order for the subject of Socrates to get closer and lose much of its marmoreal features. This book was born during the Spanish tragedy of the past 15 years, a drama the author traversed between dark personal antinomies. (22)

The prologue finishes with an attack on Nietzsche for uprooting the individual and for overlooking the roots (23), adding a prophetic cry: 'This is not a coward search for a miserable happiness, but the dream of giving back strength, fertility, hardness, and the ability to create to men, curing them – if possible – of the disease called Civilization.' An overall programme of conservative philosophy, but at the same time mundane.

6. A José-Antonian Ortega or an Orteguian José Antonio

As seems almost self-evident, references in *Vida de Sócrates* correspond to nationalist conservative ideas in Spain at that time, and from a falangista perspective: race, religion, roots, fatherland, etc., as

well as the Spenglerian or Unamunian lamenting vision of rationalism and modernity as intellectual support. Modernity is personified in those 'uprooted philosophers and sophists,' namely those without land, without soil. These words are constantly repeated by the author, forming a continuum between Socrates and himself. According to J. T. Roberts, using such analogies in an almost journalistic style was common until the second half of the twentieth century, when a lighter and more careful relationship with the historic past was gradually introduced.[45]

In accordance with the present analysis, 'Ortega from a José-Antonian perspective' means also a working method based on a 'hybridization of roles.'[46] A rigorous historicism, but one situated at the midpoint of a stylish and sometimes elegant philosophical essay (adorned with literary citations), a philological work, and, last but not least, a political essay. The tension of the work is the belief that the humanities are a key to interpreting reality and that their work should be mundane, because interpretations must be shared socially. *Vida de Sócrates* was well received by non-specialists, Tovar would say in 1984 (p. i), but not so by specialists; it was not a book for philologists, and less so for philosophers. Whatever its reception, 'Many people empathized with more than a few of the expressed opinions, however puzzling or contradictory its message' (ii). A public success but one coldly received by peers. Tovar seemed unsurprised.

The book's political texture is formed – as explained above – by a complicated idiolect of the conservative lexicon, marked by euphemism and an aggressive anti-intellectualism, linked to an obsession about land and blood, antimodernism and patriarchalism. In short (excepting the local reference to the need for the civil war to understand the Socratic mystery), a language shared by all European conservative revolutionaries of the inter-war period.[47] These studies are fundamental to understanding the book's ideological framework and political subconscious. The Spanish contribution to this ideological magma is the addition of a strong Catholic sense: in Tovar's case, his Socrates begins a line that follows Plato and runs through Christianity, visible, for example, in Fray Luis de León. Socrates was a precursor.[48]

The European conservative revolutionary type was strongly utopian, socially committed, imaginative, anti-bourgeois, elitist, and anti-communist. When the Nazis reached power, they dismantled German academia beginning with the destruction of academic autonomy. Most of those at the university who supported conservatism and ultranationalism, realized that this was not the 'spiritual revolution' they had been looking for. It was too violent and too vulgar. About the too late efforts displayed to revert the situation, Ringer comments:

> One cannot help being moved by these desperate pleas; and yet they also strike one as futile. Of course there was a real difference between the spiritual revival which the mandarins had been preaching and the fanaticism which now threatened to engulf them. The difficulty was that this distinction was hard to describe in the mandarins' own language […] What arguments, what words were still available to control the murderous fantasies which now took possession of the German people? It would have been useless to speak of simple, gratuitous humanity, because the young had been taught to seek their norms in a *wissenschaftlich weltanschauung*. Common sense in politics was discredited, along with the merely practical knowledge of positivist learning. Where could an argument against unreason have begun?[49]

Vida de Sócrates appeared after the World War's hecatomb, though it was also designed, studied, and worked upon during that tragic time and may have been conceived even before the Spanish Civil

[45]Roberts, *Athens on Trial*, 305 ff., 326, *passim*. 'These analogies can be counted on to multiply exponentially in classroom situations.'

[46]See J.L. Moreno Pestaña, *La norma de la filosofía. La configuración del patrón filosófico español tras la Guerra Civil* (Madrid: Biblioteca Nueva, 2013), 106.

[47]See F. Stern, *The Politics of Cultural Despair: A Study on the Rise of the Germanic Ideology* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1961); F.K. Ringer, *The Decline of the German Mandarins: The German Academic Community, 1890–1933* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1969). Also, P. Bourdieu, *The Political Ontology of Martin Heidegger* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991).

[48]There is a small 1947 publication, journalistic and 'promotional,' by Tovar, in which this idea, and the interesting attack on Nietzsche, is repeated ('Sócrates y el cristianismo', In: *Alférez*, 1 (1997), 3, and reprinted in *Ensayos y peregrinaciones* (1960). The aim was fulfilled in *A Book about Plato* (1956).

[49]Ringer, *The Decline*, 438.

War.[50] It may also be concluded that there was a psychological investment in the figure of Socrates: the outcast unjustly tried and condemned, as Tovar was during the Galarza affair. The book contains more than one narrative: there is also the narrative of a death in life.

Considering, as explained above, that the logic of the cultural and academic fields have their own history not always in tune with the individuals' political positioning, what relationship did Tovar maintain in 1984 with this strange 1947 palimpsest? In the 1952 foreword (p. 24), nothing is explained, apart from the important author's statement that he is 'moving away' from the book. If we read this statement as Tovar read those of the ancients, the sentence is not so clear. How is it that he 'moved away' from a book reedited in 1953, 1966, 1984?

The 1984 reprint has a very brief note comprising two very interesting pages. It must be taken into account that these were written by a 73-year-old (and probably already ill) man who was recalling his youth. He wrote that the book belonged to another time, another world, that he had tried to write an epilogue in 1965, but failed. Note that 1965 was the year he exiled himself, in direct confrontation with Franco's regime. But he describes his work as a 'shelter' and the 'dream undertaking' of the young author of 1947. He was in his 30s and wrote a book that he let go of in 1984 'without making any more confessions.' There is some ambiguity. If he had gone away, if he thought he had been wrong, why let the book be reedited without a proper rewriting? In 1984, the book needed a complete revision and, considering all of the advances in knowledge about Athenian democracy and Socrates, it was in need of a reworking even in 1965, for the 1966 reprint.[51] Why did he not get rid of ideological inanities? Might it be due to the fact that the temporalities of political positioning do not correspond to those of cultural dispositions and habitus?

7. Conclusion

Tovar's Socrates folds or adapts to his own world vision and political ideas as an attempt to retranslate the political subconscious into the book. There is a political project tied to the philosophical, philological, and scientific one: a hybridization of roles, as in the Orteguian school, but in the case of Tovar, from a falangista perspective. There is also the question of whether Tovar's vision of falangismo was the intellectualized and idealized version. Politics is not about dreams or universalities, but about tactics, compromises, and settlements, and he, just as the poet Ridruejo, finally was expelled, unable to understand and adapt.[52] The career acceleration and cultural mandarinate was compensation or a way out, or both things. His friend Ridruejo went to the Eastern Front to fight the communists, probably believing he was acting as a mystical hero or maybe trying to become a true fascist through a baptism by fire.

In 1973, Tovar conceded to an interview with Juan Luis Cebrián in *El País* as part of a media operation to 'salvage' a number of these old *falangistas 'liberales,'* in order to include them in the liberal agenda of the *Transición*.[53] This interview is interesting, not only because of what Tovar says, but also because of what he does not want to say: 'In fact, what happens to some of us, me, Aranguren, is that they are scared that we'll start talking. Not because of what we will say, but because of what we cannot say.' Tovar presents himself as an 'old liberal' ('with Ridruejo and Laín'), a champion of *orteguismo*, a defender of Ortega and Zubiri, and a supporter of academic autonomy, scientific independence. It seems that the interview reveals an ambiguous character, profoundly contradictory, but also deeply conservative in his comments and evaluations, speaking of a crisis of values, uprooting,

[50]In the 1984 prologue, he points to the existence of some 'exalted notes' and 'naivetes' written as a 'self-taught' student, all of which had disappeared from the final text. Obviously, a comparison of those notes with the published version would be of interest in order to elucidate the book's ideological genesis.

[51]In 1966, also in *Revista de Occidente*, Francisco Rodríguez Adrados published the important and monumental *Ilustración y política en la Grecia clásica* (Madrid: Ediciones de la Revista de Occidente, 1966), later reedited – with some changes – as *La democracia ateniense* (Madrid: Alianza Editorial, 1975).

[52]They among many others. The *Falange* would become, in the following generation and therefore with almost completely different dynamics, a nursery for some of the radical youth from the middle class.

[53]See note 18 above.

criticizing modernity and industrialization, even Spanish capitalists; he also, while accepting the necessity of progress and democracy, sustains the opinion that, to the contrary, the Spanish people are 'not ready' for democracy and do 'not know how to self-govern' or 'this about the 'socialism of freedom' – the true socialism, with true freedom – well, that does not work. Without going any further, there is the case of Chile, as proof, to demonstrate it.' Tovar laments the 'confusion enfolding us' and adds that 'new circumstances that cast a shadow over the scenario,' expanding: 'One of them being that the extension of social well-being [literally, '*bienestar*,' welfare] to many people, without a subsequent intellectual and moral solid counterweight, has provoked a loosening, a slackening of authority, in my view, unacceptable.' He is talking about 'los jóvenes,' the youth, that are corrupted by democracy: does that not sound familiar, similar to what the young Tovar wrote in *Vida de Sócrates*, 26 years previously, about the 'Athenian mob,' is it not the 'myth of the idle mob' mentioned above? Up to what point are some of the deepest layers of cultural and ideological habitus modified during the life of a human being? Is there a correspondence between concrete and real political positions and ideological position in a text?

8. Epilogue

In 1947, there also appeared *Sókratés. Přednášky z antické filosofie* (Socrates. Ancient Philosophy Lectures) by Czech philosopher Jan Patočka (1907–1977), who would die after a hard interrogation by the Czech Secret Police. Patočka was going to write a chapter entitled '*Sokratovský komplex*' (The Socratic Complex) for the second edition in 1968, but he did not. How he theorized, or represented, the Socratic dilemma between him and the state would be an interesting case to compare with the one dealt with herein. At one point, every philosopher in real trouble with the authorities has tended to identify with Socrates: for example, Diderot in 1749, Charles Maurras (founder of the monarchic *Action française*) in 1948. Did Patočka identify with the old sophist who drank the hemlock? That would have been an accurate metaphor. Did he identify the Czech Communist Party or the Bolsheviks with the Athenian tribunal? If so, it was a meager service to the history of democracy. But he did not: politics is missing from his book. Patočka's Socrates is an existential philosopher. Interestingly enough, the Czech philosopher would study in Germany in 1933, but his was a pure philosophical habitus.

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